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[L. A. No. 24992. In Bank. Aug. 10, 1959.J

UNION INTERCHANGE, INC. (a Corporation) et at, Respondents, v. WYNNE A. SAVAGE, as Real Estate
Commissioner, et al., Appellants.

o

[1] Injunctions-Dissolution and Modification-Permanent Injunctions.-A trial court has inherent power to modify or vacate a
permanent preventive injunction on a showing that there has
been a change in the controlling facts on which the injunction
rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or
where the ends of justice would be served by modification.
This power is necessary because a preventive injunction is
fundamentally different from any other judgment or decree;
it is in essence of an executory or continuing nature, creating
no rights but merely assuming to protect a right from unlawful
and injurious interference.
[2] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlcation.-When it can be shown that
circumstances have so changed that an injunction is no longer
necessary or desirable, the trial court has inherent power to
amend it in the interest of providing justice for all parties in
interest.
[3] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlcation.-Unforeseen circumstances
necessitating modification or dissolution of a preventive injunction may occur regardless of whether the injunction is "permanent" or "preliminary" in form.
[4] Id.-Dissolution and Moditlca.tion.-When an injunction decree
is continuing in nature, directed at future events, it must be
subject to adaptation as events may shape the need. In the
case of a preliminary injunction, there may be need for
adaptability to maintain the status quo pending final determination of the matter in controversy.

r1] Power to alllend permanent injunction, notes, 68 A.L.R. 1180;
136 A.L.R. 765. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Iujuudion!!, § 98; Am.Jur.,
Iujuucliulll!, 314 et seq.
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Injullctions, § 81; [2-4] Injunctions,
§78; [5-8] Injunctions, §79; [9,10] Injunctions, §88.
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[5] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary InjunctionR.Thr. power to modify 01' reyoke It pr'elimin:try injunction is I\n
inherent powl'r not drpendent 011 statutr.
[6] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary Injunctions. Code Civ. Proc., § 532, authorizes a motion to dissolve whE'n a
preliminary injunction was granted without notice, but does
not prevent the dissolntion of a preliminary injunction granted
on notice.
[7] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Temporary Injunctions.To require a specific reservation in an injunction order to retain jurisdiction in the trial court to dissolve it would seem
to place undue emphasis on formalism, and such requirement
is not justified simply because the injunction is "temporary"
in form.

o

[8] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Preliminary Injunctions.The rule that a trial court has inherent power to modify or
vacate a preventive injnnction on a proper showing applics
to preliminary as well as permanent prevent.ive injunctions.
(Overruling Ut~ited Railroads v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. 755
[151 P. 129].)
[9] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Discretion of Court.-The
granting, denial, dissolving or refusing to dissolve a permanent
or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court on a consideration of all the particular circumstances in each case, and sueh order will not be modified or
dissolved on appeal except for abuse of discretion.
[10] Id.-Dissolution and Modification-Discretion of Court.-It
was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to dissolve a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from enforcement of
the Advance Fee Amendments to the Business and Professions
Code (Stats. 1955, ehap.-1678) as applied to plaintiffs, where
no change of eirculllstances since the injunction was originally
issued was urged for amending or dissolving it, where in view
of substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute
the trial court could have found that irreparable injury would
result fr01l1 a refusal to continue to enjoin its enforcement until
final determination on the merits, and where, in light of the
conflicting affidavits, it could not he said as a matter of law
that plaintiffs' activities fell within the scope of the challenged
legislation or that it was constitutional as it was sought to be
applied to them.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County denying motion to vacute a pt'dilUiuary injunction. Bayard Rhone, Judge. Affirmed.
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Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General, .
Lee B. Stanton and Neal J. Gobar, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Appellants.
Alvin G. Greenwald for Respondents.
'I'RAYNOR, J.-On September 2, 1955, plaintiffs filed a
complaint for declaratory relief and injunction, seeking a .
declaration that their business operations were outside the
scope of certain amendments to the Busincss and Professions
Code relating to the regulation of real estate and busilles.-;
opportunities transactions. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 10026,
10131, 10132, 10134, 10252, 10252.5, 10253, 10253.5, 1025i:i,
10305, 10501, 10502, 10506.) In the alternative they sought.
a declaration that those sections were unconstitutional. They
claimed that the application of those sections to their business I
activities would violate constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and press, due process of law, and equal protection
of the law, and would contravene the commerce clause of
the rllited States Constitution. They sought a preliminary
injunction to stay enforcement of the amendments pending
the action for declaratory relief and a permauent injunction
restraining such enforcement after hearing and decision on the
merits. After service of notice on defendants and a hearing
on the order to show cause, the ·court on October 24, 1955,
granted the preliminary injunction. That order restrains defendants "pending the determination of this cause, from interfering with the plaintiffs, their agents, servants, and employees, by instituting any criminal complaint, action or pro'ceeding against them for violation of . . . the Advance Fee
Amendments." No appeal was taken from tIle order.
On October 1,1957, defendants presented a motion to vacate
the preliminary injunction with supporting affidavits and
points and authorities. The motion was based on the grounds
that plaintiffs' activities were unlawful under legislation enacted before the effective date of the advance fee amendments,
and that" a recent decision of the trial court in Connecticut
held that the operations of the plaintiffs and cross-defendants
were subject to the Connecticut Advance Fee Law which is '
substantially the same as that of California, and said court
upheld the constitutionality of said law."1 Defendants ap'I'

o

'The (lecision hns since been reversed by the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut which held the ll"gislation uncol1stitutional. (United
Illtl'rl'}Hmge v. Sl'elllU'Y, 1H Conn. 647 [136 A.2d 801].)
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peal from an order of the trial court denying the motion to
vacate the preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs contend that the order must be affirmed on the
ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the
. temporary injunction pending the trial on the merits. This
contention lacks merit. [1] In Sontag Ohain Stores 00. v.
Supel'ior Oourt, 18 Ca1.2d 92 [113 P.2d 689], we held that a
trial court has inherent power to modify or vacate a permanent
preventive injunction upon a showing that "there has been a
change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction
rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or
where there the ends of justice would be served by modification." (18 Ca1.2d at 95.) We recognized in that case that
although "it is the long established policy of the law to •..
accord finality to judgments," the trial courts must be given
power to modify or dissolve preventive injunctions issued by
them. This power is necessary because a preventive injunction is fundamentally different from any other judgment or
.decree: it "is in essence of an executory or continuing nature,
creating no right but merely assuming to protect a right from
unlawful and injurious interference." (18 Cal.2d at 94.)
[2] When it can be shown that circumstances have so changed
that an injunction is no longer necessary or desirable, the
trial court has power to amend it in the interest of providing
justice for all parties in interest. "The court's power in
this respect is an inherent one." (18 Cal.2d at 94.)
[3] The fact that a preventive injunction purports to be
"permanent" or "preliminary" in form is not significant.
Unforeseeable circumstances necessitating modification or dissolution of the injunction may occur in either case. [4] When
the decree is continuing in nature, directed at future events,
it inust be subject to adaptation as events may shape the need.
In the case of a preliminary injunction, there may be need for
adaptability to maintain the status quo pending final determination of the matter in controversy. It would be incongruous to hold that the trial court has inherent power to
modify a permanent preventive injullction, but lacks the '
power to modify a preliminary or temporary preventive injunction that may remain in force for years.2
[5] This power has been recognized in such cases as
Wheeler v. Super'jor Oourt, 82 Cal.App. 202 [255 P. 275],
'The injunction in the present cnse, for example, was issued on October
24, 11155.
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which held that the trial court had jurisdiction to modify or
suspend a preliminary injunction when that right was ref;erved in the order. (See also State Oomp. Ins. Fund v.
Maloney, 121 Cal.App.2d 33, 43 [262 P.2d 662] ; Tulare Irr.
Dist. v. Superior Oourt, 197 Cal. 649, 666-667 [242 P. 725].)
These cases support the view that the power to modify or
revoke a preliminary injunction is an inherent power not dependent upon statute, and that it was not the purpose of section 532 of the Code of Civil Procedure to limit the trial
court's discretion to modify its orders when fairness and
equity so require.· [6] That section authorizes a motion to
dissolve when a preliminary injunction was granted without
notice. Plaintiffs' contention that the section prevents the dissolution of a preliminary injunction granted on notice is inconsistent with the theory and holding of the cited cases. If a
trial court does not have power to dissolve a preliminary injunction except in the manner provided by that statute, it is
immaterial that it purports to retain such jurisdiction. The
court could not by decree restore such jurisdiction in the face
of valid statutory exclusion.
[7] Moreover, to require a specific reservation in the order
to retain jurisdiction in the trial court would seem to place
undue emphasis on formalism. Such a requirement is not
justified simply because the injullction is "temporary" in
form. [8] The rationale of United Railroads v. Superi.or
Oou,·t, 170 Cal. 755 [151 P. 129, Ann.Cas. 1916E 199], that
the status of a case pending decision on the merits must be
"definitely and finally determined once and for all," (170
Cal. at 759) has been rejected and the case itself distinguished
and modified in numerous later cases. (Sontag Ohain Stores
00. v. Superi.or Oourt, 18 Cal.2d 92, 95-96 [113 P.2d 689]
[citing Tulare Irr. Disi. v. Superior Oourt, 197 Cal. 649 [242
P. 725] ; Wheeler v. Superior Oourt, 82 Cal.App. 202 [255
P. 275] ; see also American Trading 00. v. Superior Omtrt,
192 Cal. 770 [222 P. 142] ; Branker v. Superior OOllrt, 165

.

'Section 532 provides, in part, that: ' 'If an injunction is granted
without notice to the person enjoined, he may apply, upon reasonable
notice to the judge who granted the injunction, or to the court in which
the action was brought, to dissolve or modify the same." It would seem
that the !!ection wall meant to serve as a guarantee that a party would
have at least one hearing on the matter, rnther than as a general reo
striction on the "(Iuity power of the courts. 'rhe (Iuotcd part of the scction WIlS rt'n<lered meaningle!!s by a 1911 umendment to the statute
prohibiting the granting of a preliminary injunction without notice to
the opposite party. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 527.)

/,')
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Cal.App.2d 816 [332 P.2d 711].) We have concluded thereforE', that the United Railroads case should be overruled, and
that the rule of the Sontag case applies to preliminary a.c;
wen as permanent preventive injunctions. (See Branker v.
Superior Court, 165 Cal.App.2d 816 [332 P.2d 711].) Thus,
in the instant case the trial court had jurisdiction to consider
and pass upon defendants' motion and to determine whether
there has been a change in the controlling factors upon which
the injunction rested or whether the ends of justice would be
served by modification of the order.
[9] Although the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain
the motion, we have concluded that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the preliminary injunction pending a hearing on the merits. "It is a rule so universally followed and so often stated as to need only to be referred to
that the granting, denial, dissolving or refusing to dissolve
a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case." (Kend.all v.
Foulks, 180 Cal. 171, 174 [179 P. 886].) Such an order will
not be modified or dissolved on appeal except for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Black's Food Store, 16 Cal.2d 59, 61
[105 P.2d 361]; McCoy v. Matich, 128 Cal.App.2d 50, 52
(274 P.2d 714]; Wilms v. Hand, 101 Cal.App.2d 811, 815
[226 P.2d 728].)
[10] Defendants contend that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to refuse to dissolve the injunction on the
grounds that: (1) the Advance Fee Amendments to the Bnsiness and Professions Code (Stats. 1955, chap. 1678) are constitutionalon their face; (2) as a matter of law plaintiffs'
activities fall within the proscription of that legislation; and
that (3) as a matter of law the injury to the public from plaintiffs' activities far outweighs any possible injury to plaintiffs
from a refusal to enjoin the enforcement of the statute pending
a final determination on the merits. These contentions lack
merit. No change of circumstances since the injnnction was
originally issned is urged for now amending or dissolving it.
Since there is substantial doubt as to the constitutionality
of the statute (see United Interchange v. Harding, 154 Me.
128 [145 A.2d 94] [Maine]; United Interchange v. Spellacy,
144 Conn. 647 [136 A.2d 801] [Conn.], holdiug similar It>gislatioll unconstitntiollal), the trial ('ol1rt could well have found
that irreparable injury would result from a refusal to con-
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tinue to enjoin its enforcement until a final determination is
made on the merits. Moreover, in light of the conflicting
affidavits before the trial court, it cannot be said as a matter
of law that plaintiffs' activities fall within the scope of the
challenged legislation or that it is constitutional as it is sought
to be applied to them. These questions can be determined
more appropriately after a trial on the merits.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J.t and
Peters, J.,·concurred.

